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ABSTRACT 
Data mining is a mature technology, widespread in both 
government and industry.  The proliferation of data storage 
in public and private sectors has provided more information 
than can be expediently processed.  Data mining provides a 
means to extract meaningful conclusions from this growing 
store of data.  In the interests of countering criminal and 
terrorist activity, data mining has become a focus of law 
enforcement and government agencies.  The use of databases 
containing information on persons may conflict with privacy 
rights and laws.  Gathering public awareness of government 
data mining programs and databases has been accompanied 
with concern and investigation of these programs.  
Following a review of data mining and privacy issues, in 
2008 the National Research Council (NRC) recommended any 
training in development of data mining programs involving 
personal data be conducted using synthesized data.  This 
thesis seeks to present an underlying discussion of these 
issues, to include data mining use, a simple data synthesis 
model for analysis to support the validity of the NRC 
recommendation, and the associated difficulties encountered 
in the process.  Included is an analysis of the inherent 
difficulty in creating realistic and useful data.             
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 This thesis seeks to address the problem of creating 
realistic and useful data in support of data mining 
programs designed to the threat of domestic terrorism.   
Since the attacks of 2001, the federal government has 
implemented many data mining programs in support of 
counterterrorism.  Information on the efficacy of these 
programs and their methodology is very limited.  Many of 
the data mining programs are classified, creating 
additional problems for meaningful public discussion.  
Because many such programs necessarily involve the use of 
personally identifiable information (PII), concern has 
arisen over the implementation of these programs and what 
impact they have on the privacy of U.S. citizens.  
Improving, expanding, or modifying programs presents a 
challenge without a useful and realistic body of data from 
which to test the systems.   
Real data representing PII of U.S. citizens would 
present one potential test data set for the research and 
testing of data mining approaches.  Such data is attractive 
because ultimately it is largely this data that will be 
used as input to these programs.  These bodies of data 
(e.g., individual Social Security numbers, tax data, etc.), 
however, are governed by privacy laws and regulations as to 
the purposes and disclosure of their use to affected 
individuals.  
Because the use of real data to develop or test data 
mining programs using PII is problematic, a possible 
 2 
alternative is the use of synthetic data.  Such data must 
be created, however, which remains a challenge.  Creating 
data that mirrors real data is a hard problem.  
Nonetheless, given the requirement and motivation by law 
enforcement for data mining programs utilizing PII, a real 
need for simulated data exists. 
A.   MOTIVATION  
A fundamental part of counterterrorism activities is 
detecting and preventing terrorism.  Those who would commit 
terrorism frequently first decide to commit such acts and 
subsequently make plans.  Data mining technology may 
present a useful tool to detect such planning.  Analysis of 
circumstances surrounding the attacks of September 2001 
revealed numerous correlations in the patterns of the 
attackers before the attacks occurred.  The use of data 
mining technology in such a circumstance could have allowed 
investigators to detect and investigate the perpetrators 
before the attacks, which presumably might have prevented 
the attacks from occurring.  
Planning to commit a terrorist act is in itself a 
punishable crime, if the intended act would involve 
destruction of a public transportation system1.  Thus, if 
the September 2001 attackers had been caught in the act of 
planning the attacks, they could have been tried, convicted 
and imprisoned even if the attacks had not been carried 
out. 
                     
1 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2332. 
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In 2008 the National Research Council of the National 
Academies released its report ―Protecting Individual 
Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists‖ (National 
Research Council, 2008), which analyzed federal data mining 
efforts in light of growing privacy concerns.  The NRC 
report concluded ―…high priority should be given to 
developing programs to detect intended attacks before they 
occur so that there is a chance of preventing them.‖   
A problem with this approach, however, is that in the 
planning phase potential terrorists have not yet committed 
a violent act, and are otherwise co-mingled with regular 
citizens in the routines of daily life.  How can a program 
detect and cull the terrorists from the innocent citizens 
without studying the behavior or relationships of both, and 
thereby invade the privacy of the innocent? 
Given these problems, the NRC concluded as one of its 
key recommendations that any data mining programs intending 
to use the PII of U.S. citizens should first be created and 
tested using synthetic data in order to protect the privacy 
of citizens.   
B. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis will explore the combined issues of data 
mining and privacy within the framework presented in the 
recommendations of the NRC.  Specifically, the problem of 
creating realistic and useful synthesized (i.e., fake) data 
will be addressed.  A study of data will be conducted 
exploring the complexity of manufacturing realistic and 
useful data.  Existing federal data mining programs will be 
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presented in order to grasp the measure and make-up of the 
data used in such programs.  Finally, an analysis of the 
inherent obstacles to creating synthetic data will be 
presented in light of the NRC recommendation.   
For the purposes of this analysis, the concept of data 
―aggregation‖ or ―fusion‖ may be implied in the discussion 
of some data mining programs or functions as either a 
subset or result of data mining actions, though technically 
they may be viewed as separate functional areas. 
 5 
II. PRIOR AND RELATED WORK 
Data mining efforts and research have attempted to 
mitigate privacy concerns with work in three areas; 
synthesized data, data sanitization/anonymization, and real 
data not subject to privacy concerns.  The following three 
sections will explore these types of data in more detail. 
A.   USE OF SYNTHETIC DATA 
Existing research regarding the creation of 
synthesized data is found in several areas, to include 
fraud detection, medical use, and PII.  The latter of these 
three is the focus of this study.  Other efforts of 
interest include creation of data for the purposes of 
population and urban planning, evaluation of computer 
security, and data generation for digital forensics 
training. 
Data generation modules in support of counterterrorism 
research for data mining have been developed by the 
University of California, Riverside in conjunction with 
Lucent technologies. An initial design created a data 
generation module to create person names and credit card 
information, to include transaction information (Jeske, et 
al., 2005).  The application creates names from lists of 
first names and surnames, social security numbers from the 
Social Security Administration‘s deceased list, and credit 
card numbers based on the rules associated with actual 
credit card company number pools.  Other attributes, such 
as age, income, gender, etc. were created and associated 
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using three types of algorithms to generate credit card 
transaction information.  A second iteration later added a 
new shipping container (related to importing goods) 
information application (Jeske, Lin, Rendon, Xiao, & 
Samadi, 2006).  
A team from the University of Arkansas addressed an 
issue of the need for large ―industrial‖ data sets in order 
to properly test data mining systems, and presented a model 
using parallelism (i.e., data generation across multiple 
processors) (Hoag & Thompson, 2007). 
The open source Urban Sim project provides a model for 
urban development for land use, environment and 
transportation planning (Waddell, 2002).  According to the 
article ―Urban Sim: Modeling Urban Development for Land 
Use, Transportation and Environmental Planning,‖ the 
project encompasses a wide capability range including city 
and population modeling based on census, land parcel and 
business data, among others.    Included in the article is 
a more detailed comparison of Urban Sim with three related 
and/or previous efforts, many of which faced the same issue 
of synthetic data production.  Urban Sim does not make use 
of PII (real or synthesized), though presumably it could be 
expanded to do so. 
Within the field of computer security, another example 
of synthesized data includes that created by Lincoln Labs 
to test the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency  
(DARPA) developed Intrusion Detection systems in 1998-99 
(Lee, Stolfo, & Mok, 1999).  Given the sensitivity of real 
data, the project created sets of attack data and routine 
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organization data ―noise.‖  McHugh offers insights and 
criticism regarding the lack of realism contained in the 
data sets created in the DARPA project (McHugh, 2000).  
A further example of synthetic data is in support of 
digital forensics investigator training.  The Forensic 
Image Generator project of the University of Mannheim seeks 
to produce realistic digital images for student analysis 
(Moch & Freiling, 2009).  Using instructor generated 
scripts and the Python programming language, the Generator 
produces file system images that attempt to mirror real 
files that might be generated on a computer system by a 
user.  As of 2009 the Generator was still in its prototype 
stage.  Like data mining for counterterrorism, the 
motivation for this project also stems from the need to 
avoid using real data to protect privacy.    
A final example is presented in the computer gaming 
world.  The ―Sim‖ products from Electronic Arts allow for 
the fabrication of worlds and people.  The version Sim City 
offers gamers the ability to create and manage synthetic 
cities over time.  The Sims versions allow for the creation 
and manipulation of individual people.  In terms of 
application to data synthesis for data mining for 
counterterrorism, neither of these products is useful.  Sim 
City has a level of resolution of detail too low, and The 
Sims has a level too high.  Perhaps more importantly, 
neither system allows for a principled simulation from 
grounded assumptions, or the automated collection of 
simulation data.   
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B.   DATA SANITIZATION/ANONYMIZATION 
Efforts and proposals to utilize real data that has 
been sanitized to remove Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) have not been fully successful under 
public and academic scrutiny.  Research programs, such as 
the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program, proposed a 
combination of methods.  The methods proposed included 
privacy appliances (cryptographic mechanisms inserted 
between human users and databases), methods of data hiding 
(revealing limited record information not completely 
displaying all elements of PII), selective revelation 
(revealing greater amounts of PII as data qualified for 
more potential malicious activity), and effective oversight 
through independent audit (Popp & Poindexter, 2006).  
Opponents and proponents of data sanitization approaches 
argue the validity of privacy preservation.   While Popp 
and Poindexter (2006) may present privacy preservation 
approaches as effective or acceptable means to hiding PII, 
others argue that the mere existence of databases 
containing PII (and the fusion of such databases into new 
data records) potentially creates a violation of individual 
privacy, especially if it leads to unwanted surveillance 
(Garfinkel, 2006).  The existence of these databases may be 
unknown to the individuals whose information they contain.  
Several questions arise from this discussion.  A 
fundamental question is, if such databases contain PII and 
exist in some electronic media but are never actually seen 
by analysts, has a breach of privacy been committed?  If 
such records are created, does the individual have a 
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reasonable expectation that it will be securely stored 
and/or properly deleted at some point in time?     
A second case is the Netflix Prize wherein the NetFlix 
movie rental-by-mail company released sanitized records of 
more than 500 million individuals‘ movie preferences 
(Bennett & Lanning, 2007).  Using data perturbation 
techniques and other data available on Internet movie 
sites, the dataset was ―re-identified,‖ offering 
compromised access to actual individual identities and 
political affiliations (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2008).  
Similar to the NetFlix re-identification problem, in 
2006 the New York Times reported that the internet provider 
America Online (AOL) released a large dataset containing 
the search data of some 657,000 users (M. Barbaro & T. 
Zeller, 2006).  The 20 million records displayed specific 
search terms entered by users with each individual user 
―anonymized‖ by an AOL provided user number.  Users sued 
after release of the data set resulted in incidences of re-
identification and general privacy concerns (CNN Money, 
2006). 
C. USE OF REAL DATA 
In other situations, it has been shown that real data 
not subject to privacy concerns can be used to trace 
malicious activities.  This category is useful not only in 
demonstrating the usefulness of data mining in general, but 
also in segregating that portion of data available for 
analysis without regard to privacy concerns.  Such data 
includes criminal records.  The COPLINK research project of 
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the University of Arizona has demonstrated success 
discovering deceptive aliases of criminals using real data 
from the Tucson Police Department (Wang, Chen, & Atabakhsh, 
2004).  Using records of known criminals and records using 
known aliases from actual Police records, the project was 
able to correctly identify criminals at a success rate 
greater than 95%.  Other areas of study under the same 
project showing promising results include criminal network 
analysis, police report entity extraction, and authorship 
analysis in cybercrime.   
Other non-private data used in data mining includes 
international trade data.  Using data published by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, and contained in 
the U.S. Merchandise trade database, potential money 
laundering and terrorist financing through overvaluing or 
undervaluing imports and exports was illustrated in 
―Detecting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing via 
Data Mining‖ (Zdanowicz, 2004).     
D.   CONCLUSION 
While data mining continues to evolve as a mature 
technology, evidence of a protracted effort to develop and 
use synthetic data for data mining research has not been 
found.  Some research into modeling medical or population 
data exists, but there are few programs that model and 
manufacture realistic personally identifiable information 
(PII), or which do so on a broad scope.  Moreover, in its 
recommendation to use synthetic data for the development of 
data mining programs, the National Research Council did not 
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offer any guidance on how such data might be modeled or 
created (National Research Council, 2008).  
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III. DATA MINING FOR COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE U.S.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Data mining technology has seen considerable 
advancement in capability and use over the past two 
decades.  (Fayyad & Uthurusamy, 2002) offers a simple 
definition of data mining as ―the identification of 
interesting structure in data.‖  (Apte, 1997) offers yet 
another definition: ―…the process by which accurate and 
previously unknown information is extracted from large 
volumes of data.‖  As data storage capability has rapidly 
increased across numerous functional areas, vast data 
warehouses have become available for the practice of data 
mining (Fayyad & Uthurusamy, 2002).  Data mining is 
commonly used for commercial and medical purposes.  
Commercial data mining might seek to aid business leaders 
in pursuing targeted customer bases while medical data 
mining seeks to maximize patient health care or discover 
trends in ailments.  Data mining can also be used to search 
for evidence of criminal activity and its perpetrators.  
This kind of data mining is generally conducted by law 
enforcement agencies.  In this capacity data mining offers 
considerable opportunity to prevent crime or identify 
potential criminals or terrorists.   
The gravity of the attacks against the United States 
in September 2001 focused law enforcement agencies on the 
vital task of preventing future attacks against innocent 
populations.  Given the increasing reliance on technology 
and vast data available via the global information grid, 
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data mining has emerged as a widely-used method to detect 
criminal patterns and uncover potentially malicious social 
networks (Governmental Accounting Office, 2004). As 
worldwide data storage capacity has increasingly exceeded 
computing capability, the need for efficient extraction of 
relevant but buried data and follow-on analysis becomes 
evident (Fayyad & Uthurusamy, 2002).   
As a counterterrorism tool, data mining faces 
challenges.  Data potentially containing information on 
terrorists is necessarily mixed with the data of non-
terrorists. Public awareness of federal activities, 
including the Information Awareness Office‘s Total 
Information Awareness (TIA) program in 2002 and alleged 
National Security Agency use of public phone records in 
2003, resulted in Congressional hearings and widespread 
criticism of data mining programs in relation to privacy 
concerns (Garfinkel, 2006).  Additionally, the need for 
useful database records (i.e., data in useful format), 
presumably gathered from numerous active sources both 
public and private, would require significant management 
and maintenance.   
B. DATA MINING: LINK ANALYSIS VS. PATTERN MATCHING  
Data mining for terrorism could implement numerous 
technologies and methodologies to achieve its goal.  A 
complete survey of data mining technology is outside the 
scope of this paper; however, discussion of two main 
categories of data mining, link analysis and pattern 
matching, is relevant to the focus of this paper. 
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1.  Link Analysis 
Link analysis, sometimes referred to as ‗subject-
based‘ data mining, offers a simple but effective form of 
data mining and underscores the usefulness of data mining 
given large data sets.  With link analysis, a known data 
item of interest can be linked to other items based on 
actual events in reality.  For instance, if a certain 
street address is known to be a criminal ―hide-out,‖ an 
individual having the same residence could be linked 
through an address-matching algorithm to the criminal 
activity.  Such links could easily be made on a small scale 
by an investigator following traditional investigative 
methods.  Given the large data sets available containing 
such records, link analysis data mining presents a useful 
automated approach to the procedure.  
Link analysis suffers from several technical problems 
including errors in data and differences in schemas.  For 
example, the data entry representing an individual who 
resides at ―123 Baker Street‖ might actually be recorded as 
residing at ―124 Baker Street‖ or ―123 Bokor Street.‖  A 
simple link analysis data mining program might fail to 
match two separate records based on these errors.  Entries 
might also differ in other ways.  One database might 
display an address as ―123 Baker Street‖ while another 
might present the same address as ―0123 Baker Street,‖  
―#123 Baker Street,‖ or  ―123 BAKER STREET‖. 
Two or more databases that use different schemas to 
organize their data and used as input to a data mining 
program can create problems for link analysis.  For 
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example, one data base might present an individual‘s 
address in three fields; number, street name, and street 
descriptor (e.g., ―Avenue‖).  Another database might simply 
have one field ―Address‖ containing all of the data.‖  
Numerous other variations in data presentation could 
result, requiring careful design of programs to allow for 
differences.  For example, one database might represent the 
address with street name and number, while another might 
list the real property data having book number or plot 
number.     
DeRosa (2004) provides an illustration of the 
potential of link analysis, demonstrating the links (termed 
―degrees of separation‖) between all of the September 2001 
attackers beginning with the three known suspects.  Each of 
the attackers could be linked to the original three known 
terrorist suspects.         
2.  Pattern-Based Data Mining 
A second major category of data mining technology is 
pattern-based data mining.  This method seeks to detect 
malicious activity (in the case of data mining for 
counterterrorism) by discovering patterns in behavior.  In 
this case, unlike link analysis, an individual or specific 
place may not be known to investigators a priori.  Instead, 
a specific pattern of behavior (such as the example of 
purchasing large amounts of fertilizer and renting a truck) 
may be used as a filter.  The identity of individuals 
matching this pattern of activity may then be culled from 
large amounts of data and subsequently targeted for further 
investigation.   
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Jonas and Harper (2006) point out that pattern-based 
(or ―predictive‖) data mining suffers from several inherent 
problems.  First, such programs invariably result in 
numerous ―false positives.‖  In other words, if a program 
resulted in 100 potential leads to criminal activity, only 
5% might actually be valid.  Researching each lead of 
potential criminal activity is very costly in terms of 
resources; because of the high false positive rate, much 
investigative effort is wasted. Moreover, the false leads, 
besides being wasteful, results in innocent people being 
surveilled.  
Jonas and Harper (2006) also note that predicting a 
pattern is easy if it is already known, but in reality 
terrorists may form new plots and methods that have not yet 
been used in order to achieve surprise.  Unless such 
patterns can be ‗guessed‘ by authorities prior to an 
attack, pattern-based data mining methods would not 
necessarily be helpful.  
C. THE EMERGENCE OF DATA MINING AS A COUNTERTERRORISM 
TOOL  
Analysis of past terrorist attacks has shown that data 
mining technology would have been useful in detecting some 
kind of terrorist planning and activities.  While some 
dispute the efficacy of such data mining technologies as 
pattern based (or predictive) data mining, simple link 
analysis could have detected the events leading to many of 
these crimes (Jonas & Harper, 2006). 
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1.  9/11 Attacks and Resulting Actions 
Leading up to September 2001, the attackers built a 
significant data trail of evidence related to the planning 
of the attack.  Some of the attackers‘ names were known to 
authorities as possible terrorists linked to the USS Cole 
bombing and other known terrorists.  Other 9/11 attackers 
left address records which matched those of the terrorists 
known to authorities.  They obtained driver‘s licenses and 
held P.O. boxes in their own names, and maintained personal 
associations with the other known terrorists.   The 9/11 
commission report concluded that ―by pursuing the leads 
available to it at the time, the government might have 
derailed the plan‖ (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States Washington DC, 2004).   
The revelations of these correlations spurred the 
creation of numerous government data mining programs.  A 
survey of many of these programs is included in ―Total 
Information Awareness and Beyond:  The Dangers of Using 
Data Mining Technology to Prevent Terrorism‖ (Anderson, 
2003).   
In the cases of both the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, similar actions 
perpetrated by the bombers could have potentially been 
detected by pattern-based data mining.  In order to commit 
the bombings, the terrorists left a data trail from renting 
large trucks and buying large quantities of fertilizers 
containing nitrates.  In both cases, the subjects were not 
agricultural workers.  These events, when correlated, offer 
investigators insight into potential terrorist activities.  
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The ability to correlate such events presents an effective 
case for the use of data mining.  As previously mentioned 
however, pattern-based data mining relies upon some 
previous knowledge or intuition of a pattern to search for. 
2.  Public Awareness of Government Activity    
Following the September 2001 attacks, the public and 
the Congress increasingly became aware of governmental 
activities with regard to data mining, and their impact on 
privacy.  In November 2002, the New York Times reported the 
existence of the Total Information Awareness (TIA) research 
program undertaken by the Defense Research Project Agency 
(DARPA).  An opinion editorial by William Safire (2002) 
offered the following:  
If the Homeland Security Act is not amended 
before passage, here is what will happen to you:  
Every purchase you make with a credit card, 
every magazine subscription you buy and medical 
prescription you fill, every Web site you visit 
and e-mail you send or receive, every academic 
grade you receive, every bank deposit you make, 
every trip you book and every event you attend -- 
all these transactions and communications will go 
into what the Defense Department describes as ―a 
virtual, centralized grand database.‖  
Followed by public outcry and Congressional inquiry over 
privacy concerns, TIA was de-funded by Congress in 2003.  
Similarly, the FBI‘s Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information 
Exchange (MATRIX), which focused on law-enforcement fusion 
among states and ―…proposed to combine public records and 
private record data from multiple databases with data  
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analysis tools,‖ failed by March 2004 due to several 
participating States withdrawing participation (Coney, 
2007).   
A third program, the Computer Assisted Prescreening 
System (CAPPS II), ―…used computer-generated profiles to 
select passengers for additional screening…‖ (Dycus, 
Berney, Banks, & Raven-Hansen, 2007).  CAPPS II was de-
funded by Congress in 2005 due to similar concerns over the 
sharing of private information.  While these programs were 
failing, other programs were being developed or planned by 
numerous government agencies. 
In 2004, the Governmental Accounting Office (GAO) 
released its report on federal agencies‘ use of data mining 
for any purpose (Governmental Accounting Office, 2004).  
The GAO reported that of 128 federal agencies surveyed in 
the report, 52 were using or planning to use data mining in 
some form.  Of these agencies, a total of 131 operational 
programs were reported, with the intent to begin 68 others.  
Of these 199 programs, 122 were reported to involve the use 
of personal data.  It further revealed that 14 of 199 
existing or planned programs were aimed at gathering 
information on potential terrorist activity.  Of these 
programs, 10 utilized PII.  The agencies ranged in 
functional category, from the Departments of Justice and 
Homeland Security to the Department of Education.  The data 
used for these programs was resourced from both the public 
and private (commercial) sectors.  Information available 
included data such as credit card transaction records and 
credit reports. 
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In its 2008 report on data mining, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) reported three separate federal 
agencies conducting data mining programs to prevent 
terrorism, including the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  The three 
programs reported on were categorized from others as those 
that used personal data.   
Given that classified data mining programs have been 
publicly acknowledged (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2009), and that the last GAO report on data 
mining from 2004 is now quite dated, it is uncertain how 
many programs currently  utilize data mining technology.   
The most comprehensive publicly available listing of 
federal programs, the 2004 GAO report, gives only very 
brief overviews in a survey fashion of 128 planned or 
operational programs across 52 federal departments.  Ten of 
these programs were focused on counterterrorism and 
utilized PII as input (see FIGURE (1)).  In 2005, the GAO 
did not repeat the survey, but focused instead on just five 
of the programs in the 2004 report, exploring their 
compliance with existing privacy-protecting goals and 
legislation (Governmental Accounting Office, 2005).  
Otherwise the GAO has not produced a definitive follow-up 










Incident Data Mart DHS Y N 1 
Case Management Data Mart DHS Y N 1 
Analyst Notebook (I2) DHS Y N 1 
Automatic Message Handling 
System 
DHS N N 1 
Secure Collaborative Operational 
Prototype / Environment 
Investigative Data Warehouse 
DoJ Y N 1 
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task 
Force Activity 
DoJ Y Y 2 
FBI Intelligence Community Data 
Mart 
DoJ Y N 1 
OIG – Project Strikeback DoE Y N 1 
Insight Smart Discovery DoD Y N 1 
Verity K2 Enterprise DoD Y N 1 
PATHFINDER DoD Y N 1 
Autonomy DoD N N 1 
National Cargo Tracking Plan DoD N N 1 
BioSense H&HS N N 1 
Reveal (*Not introduced in 2004 
Report) 
IRS Y Y 2 
―OPEN-NESS‖ SCORE : 
0:  Classified Program: few details publicly released 
1:  Program existence and purpose revealed 
2:  Data Sources Revealed 
3:  Scale of Program Revealed 
4:  Sample Data Records Released (or Sample Screenshots) 
 
Table (1) Operational or Planned Data Mining Programs listed in 
2004 GAO Report on Data Mining focused on Counterterrorism with 
―Open-ness‖ score and/or 2005 GAO Report. 
 
 
3.  Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007 
As part of the ―Implementing the Recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,‖ Congress enacted the 
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Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 20072.  Given 
the increasing awareness of federal programs and concerns 
for privacy, the Act requires annual reporting by agencies 
conducting data mining programs.  The Act required 
reporting on programs meeting the following definition: 
…a program involving pattern-based queries, 
searches, or other analyses of 1 or more 
electronic databases, where—  
(A) a department or agency of the Federal 
Government, or a non-Federal entity acting on 
behalf of the Federal Government, is conducting 
the queries, searches, or other analyses to 
discover or locate a predictive pattern or 
anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal 
activity on the part of any individual or 
individuals;  
(B) the queries, searches, or other analyses 
are not subject-based and do not use personal 
identifiers of a specific individual, or inputs 
associated with a specific individual or group of 
individuals, to retrieve information from the 
database or databases; and  
(C) the purpose of the queries, searches, or 
other analyses is not solely—  
(i) the detection of fraud, waste, or abuse 
in a Government agency or program; or  
(ii) the security of a Government computer 
system. 
For those programs meeting the definition, among others not 
included here the following requirements to be reported on 
were made by the Act [17]: 
- A thorough description of the data mining 
activity, its goals, and, where appropriate, the 
target dates for the deployment of the data 
mining activity.  
                     
2 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000ee-3. 
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- A thorough description of the data mining 
technology that is being used or will be used, 
including the basis for determining whether a 
particular pattern or anomaly is indicative of 
terrorist or criminal activity.  
- A thorough description of the data sources 
that are being or will be used.  
- An assessment of the impact or likely 
impact of the implementation of the data mining 
activity on the privacy and civil liberties of 
individuals, including a thorough description of 
the actions that are being taken or will be taken 
with regard to the property, privacy, or other 
rights or privileges of any individual or 
individuals as a result of the implementation of 
the data mining activity. 
By 2008, the Department of Homeland Security Report on Data 
Mining provided information on only three programs 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008).   
4.  Lack of Closure on Programs 
Since 2004, it has become increasingly difficult to 
find information pertaining to individual programs named in 
earlier reports.  For instance, of the three programs 
listed in the 2008 DHS report, none of them can be found in 
the 2004 GAO report.  Similarly, at present, very little 
information can be found regarding any of the programs 
listed in the 2004 GAO report (specifically those listed in 
FIGURE (1)).  How these programs have evolved is unknown.  
The effectiveness of the programs is unknown as well.  The 
reasons for this lack of closure can only be speculated 
upon.  Possible explanations include: 
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 Less directed oversight by the Congress (as 
evidenced by the lack of GAO reports published) 
of data mining programs in general  
 Programs have been canceled or defunded 
 Programs have become successful and have been 
classified or reclassified  
 Programs have been ―rolled up‖ under other 
programs and remain ―hidden‖ 
 Programs have migrated to new agencies and 
consolidated with other programs 
 Programs have been re-named or consolidated 
 National priorities have changed 
 Disclosure of program information would 
jeopardize efficacy of programs 
Other reasons may exist for the lack of information 
available on programs previously known to have existed.  Of 
these, it is plausible that public interest combined with 
disclosure guidelines have dictated the extent to which 
agencies release information.  Evidence of this exists in 
the histories presented in previous sections.  For example, 
after 2001, as the government increasingly developed new 
programs, the public (and Congress) became aware of federal 
initiatives, and concerns over privacy heightened.  In 
reaction, under Congressional direction the GAO researched 
all ongoing programs in 2004.  Having taken further action 
with the Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007, Congress 
narrowed focus on programs affecting privacy and created 
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guidelines on agency reporting.  Any agencies conducting 
data mining programs not meeting required rules would not 
need to offer any reports on their activities.  Moreover, 
given public focus on ongoing foreign wars and other 
matters, awareness of data mining programs and privacy 
concerns was most likely relegated to the sole attention of 
privacy organizations. 
 Whatever the reason(s) for the current lack of 
information on existing data mining programs, the situation 
represents a policy problem and presents difficulties to 
fulfilling the recommendations of the NRC.  Without 
detailed information on the types of data and methods of 
data mining used in actual programs, it is impossible to 
fabricate data true to the real data.  Attempts to 
fabricate realistic data would rely on speculation, or 
perhaps model data mining programs from other fields for 
which more information is available.  Such attempts would 
not be beneficial to the aim of the NRC report‘s authors in 
protecting privacy.  Data mining programs under development 
would not have the synthetic data available for which to 
conduct testing and research.        
D.   DHS REPORTS ON DATA MINING PROGRAMS (2008-2009) 
A complete survey of federal programs is outside the 
scope of this thesis.  It is germane, however, to highlight 
some existing programs for which information is available 
in order to better understand their scope and the data they 
accept as input.  Programs of interest to this study are 
those utilizing PII and aimed at countering terrorism.  The 
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programs selected are several currently implemented under 
the purview of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).   
Based on  requirements of The Federal Agency Data 
Mining Reporting Act of 2007, in 2008 the DHS Privacy 
Office released its report to Congress Data Mining: 
Technology and Policy (2008 Data Mining Report), followed 
by the 2009 Data Mining Report providing update (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2008 & 2009).  The reports focused on 
three programs meeting the definition provided in the Data 
Mining Reporting Act; the Automated Targeting System (ATS); 
the Data Analysis and Research for Trade Transparency 
System (DARTTS); and the Freight Assessment System (FAS).  
The following sections provide more detailed information on 
the three programs.  The ATS will be further broken down to 
provide more detailed analysis relevant to this study. 
1.  Automated Targeting System (ATS) 
The ATS Inbound, Outbound, and Passenger modules 
administered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 
is a comprehensive tool that focuses on travelers, cargo 
and conveyance methods in order to prevent terrorists or 
terrorist weapons from entering the United States.  As a 
legacy system (i.e., one that existed prior to 2001 in 
various forms), ATS also seeks to prevent other criminal 
activity.  The System utilizes information, including PII, 
about passengers and crew of airliners, vehicles transiting 
borders, and sea carriers.  It also tracks import trends 
and historical behavior of involved parties.  Data is 
polled, extracted, and aggregated from across numerous 
databases, public and private.  
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2.  Data Analysis and Research for Trade Transparency 
System (DARTTS) 
The DARTTS, administered by U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) seeks to detect import/export 
fraud, money laundering, or other trade-based crimes 
utilizing anomaly detection to provide leads for further 
investigation.  As a standalone system, DARTTS is not 
directly connected to any other system but relies on direct 
input from removable storage media (e.g., CDROM).  The data 
input is comprised of U.S. trade data, foreign trade data, 
and U.S. financial data.  Trade data may be collected from 
the ATS.  Financial data may include PII in the form of 
individuals carrying in excess of $10,000 while entering 
the country or making deposits in casinos.   
3. The Freight Assessment System (FAS) 
The FAS, administered by the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), is a system targeting potentially 
dangerous cargo aboard passenger aircraft.  It uses a rule-
based system to identify potentially dangerous cargo and 
does not use PII.  As of the DHS 2009 report, the data 
mining portion of the system was not yet operational. 
These systems represent a small percentage of federal 
data mining programs, yet each could be considered in 
itself a major program, comprised of other sub-elements.  
In order to assess the scope of a ―typical‖ federal program 
for the purposes of this study, it is necessary to further 
analyze and review a portion of these sub-elements.  
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E.   FOCUS ON A SPECIFIC PROGRAM: ATS IN DETAIL 
A commonality of the three programs detailed in the 
2009 DHS report is their consolidated and/or ―pyramidal‖ 
nature.  Each program accesses numerous databases across 
multiple public and commercial sources.  ATS is analyzed 
further here because it represents a relevant data mining 
program to the aims of this study, and especially because 
it is one of the few programs for which more detailed 
information is available.  ATS is comprised of six modules 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2009):   
 ATS Inbound, which tracks inbound cargo to the U.S.;  
 ATS Outbound, which tracks outbound cargo from the 
U.S.;  
 ATS Passenger, which deals with travelers aboard 
various conveyances;  
 ATS Land, which deals with private vehicles arriving 
to the U.S.;  
 ATS International, which deals with cargo tracking in 
cooperation with foreign authorities;  
 ATS Trend Analysis, which is an analytical module that 
processes information from various agencies to detect 
possible situations that warrant further 
investigation.   
The 2009 DHS report summarizes the ATS in general as 
follows:  
ATS standardizes names, addresses, 
conveyance names, and similar data so these data 
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elements can be more easily associated with other 
business data and personal information to form a 
more complete picture of a traveler, import, or 
export in context with previous behavior of the 
parties involved. Traveler, conveyance, and 
shipment data are processed through ATS and are 
subject to a real-time, rules-based evaluation.  
The report also provides information on three of the six 
modules per the requirements of the Data Mining Reporting 
Act.  Two of the three modules presented in the report and 
which use PII are detailed below. 
1.  ATS Passenger Module (ATS-P) 
The Passenger Module of the ATS assesses data on 
persons arriving or departing from U.S. international ports 
(to include sea ports).  ATS-P is a real-time, rule-based 
system used by Customs and Border patrol (CBP) officers to 
identify persons that potentially should not be allowed 
access in to the country.  Data sources include the DHS 
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), Non-Immigrant 
Information System (NIIS), Suspect and Violator Indices 
(SAVI), Passenger Name Record (PNR) information from 
commercial airlines, crossing and seizure data from the 
Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS), and the 
FBI terrorist watch list. 
Items of PII collected (in the case of commercial 
carriers) includes name, date of birth, gender, passport 
number and country of issuance, passport expiration date, 
country of residence, travel document type, and U.S. 
destination address  (Department of Homeland Security, 
2005).  The DHS issued a Privacy Impact Assessment in 2007 
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proposing new regulations to extend this rule to private 
aircraft as well (Department of Homeland Security, 2007). 
2.  ATS Inbound Module (ATS-I) 
The Inbound Module of the ATS assesses data on cargo 
inbound to the U.S. and persons associated with its 
shipment.  The 2009 DHS report summarizes the module as 
follows (Department of Homeland Security, 2009):  
ATS-Inbound assists CBP officers in 
identifying inbound cargo shipments that pose a 
high risk of containing weapons of mass effect, 
illegal narcotics, or other contraband, and in 
selecting that cargo for intensive 
examination…[and]…look at data related to cargo 
in real time and engage in data mining to provide 
decision support analysis for targeting of cargo 
for suspicious activity.  
ATS-I does not collect information from individuals but 
from private entities required by law (e.g., manifests).  
Data sources include the Automated Manifest System (AMS), 
the Automated Broker Interface (ABI), the Automated 
Commercial Environment (ACE), the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the Automated Commercial System 
(ACS), and the U.S. Department of Commerce.  Items of PII 
collected include name and address of cargo manufacturer, 
buyer, seller, and ―ship-to‖ party if different (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2008). 
F. THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION 
In a study of data mining for counterterrorism and 
government programs in general, the National Research 
Council of the National Academies produced a comprehensive 
report on the subject of data mining for counterterrorism 
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and privacy (National Research Council, 2008).  The 
previously outlined events leading up to the publication of 
the NRC report in 2008 contributed to a public environment 
and political culture concerned with individual privacy.  
The title of the report, ―Protecting Individual Privacy in 
the Struggle Against Terrorists‖ is illustrative.  The 
following recommendation was included in the report:  
To protect the privacy of innocent people, 
the research and development of any information-
based counterterrorism program should be 
conducted with synthetic population data. If and 
when a program meets the criteria for deployment 
in the committee‘s illustrative framework 
described in Chapter 2, it should be deployed 
only in a carefully phased manner, e.g., being 
field tested and evaluated at a modest number of 
sites before being scaled up for general use. At 
all stages of a phased deployment, data about 
individuals should be rigorously subjected to the 
full safeguards of the framework. 
No discussion of how this data would be created or its uses 
is offered in the report.  The NRC also recommended strict 
audit and oversight of any such programs using PII. 
G.     CONCLUSION 
  Use of data involving PII may result in situations 
where innocent individuals are targeted for surveillance or 
investigation based on poor conclusions a data mining 
program may have made.  Such false positive conclusions may 
be made as a result of an individual‘s records or behavior 
matching preconceived rules of a system but which are 
otherwise not criminal in nature.  The NRC report 
maintains: 
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 …even in well-managed programs such tools 
are likely to return significant rates of false 
positives, especially if the tools are highly 
automated.  Because the data being analyzed are 
primarily about ordinary, law-abiding citizens 
and businesses, false positives can result in 
invasion of their privacy (National Research 
Council, 2008).   
Individuals falsely identified as criminal, or even as 
possible suspects considered otherwise innocent, may then 
be subjected to unwanted surveillance (Garfinkel, 2006), 
public ridicule, detention or worse.  The GAO offers an 
example in its 2005 report on Data Mining of such 
situations. Lists of names of suspected ―suicide bombers‖ 
were given to the FBI by foreign governments.  The FBI 
subsequently investigated the lists to ascertain if any of 
the names matched or were similar to names or persons 
residing in the United States (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2005).  Such situations could lead directly to 
the surveillance of innocent persons.  This scenario also 
presents a further nuance of the challenges of privacy and 
data mining.  A suicide bomber only carries that 
description after they have committed the crime.  
Identification of persons who might commit such an act 
identifies what remains an otherwise innocent person.  
The Automated Targeting System of the Customs and 
Border Protection agency may be considered representative 
of a typical federal data mining program.  As a subject of 
study in the scope of this thesis, it presents an 
illustration of the great scope of the challenge of 
fabricating data for the purpose of developing new data 
mining programs per the National Research Council 
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recommendations.  It is noted, however, that the ATS is a 
Program built upon other programs and developed over a 
period of many years, refined across emerging technologies, 
and consolidated across various agencies.  As such, it may 
not be representative of the singular data mining program 
that a federal agency might seek to implement or add to its 
arsenal.  An attempt to create synthesized data on a 
smaller scale for a singular program might pose a more 
realistic challenge as a foundation for this research. 
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IV.  DATA MINING RESEARCH AND SYNTHETIC DATA 
A.   PURPOSE OF SYNTHETIC DATA 
Given the extensive use of data mining by the 
government for detection of terrorist activity, it is  
reasonable to expect that current programs may be expanded 
or modified, and that other programs will be developed in 
the future.  Per the NRC recommendation, such programs 
would benefit from the availability of synthetic data 
protecting the real private data of persons.   
How will these programs be tested?  How will they be 
certified (and using what data) by other or outside 
agencies, if required?  Will existing databases containing 
the PII of average citizens be used as input to test the 
programs?  For example, suppose a government agency 
developed a new data mining program that accepted as input 
the names, addresses, tax information, and prior gun 
purchases of individuals.  Would that agency have a 
reasonable expectation that other agencies such as the IRS 
and FBI readily provide them with existing databases from 
which to test their new program?   
Some might argue that the fusion of such data in 
itself creates a scenario in which individual privacy 
rights are violated.  Even in a testing/research 
environment, in this scenario a new data record would exist 
that locates an individual, points to their earnings and 
tax forfeitures, and lists their firearms possibly located 
in the home.  Such a record would presumably not only 
violate a reasonable person‘s expectation of privacy, but 
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would also violate existing privacy laws3 that regulate the 
government‘s access to non-governmental data.  
Data containing PII does not solely exist in the 
public sector.  While data such as individual driver‘s 
license data and tax records are stored by the government, 
other data, such as credit history or details of credit 
transactions, are held in the private sector.  Private data 
is already used as input to federal data mining programs 
(Governmental Accounting Office, 2004).  Regarding sources 
of data in general, the National Research Council (2008) 
concludes:  
The government collects information from 
many industry and government organizations, 
including telecommunications, electricity, 
transportation and shipping, law enforcement, 
customs agents, chemical and biological 
industries, finance, banking, and air 
transportation. 
 When combined, data from focused mining of such data stores 
may provide clues pertaining to a broader picture of an 
individual‘s activities.  Extending the previous example, 
in addition to tax records and gun purchases, the same 
program might track hardware store purchases to find large 
purchases of fertilizer.  An average citizen might not 
object to the government learning they purchased a new 
hammer, but a farmer buying fertilizers might object to 
appearing on a list of potential terrorists, along with his 
yearly earnings and previous gun purchases. 
                     
3 The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 (Public Law 103-
159) mandates destruction of handgun sales transactions by federal 
agencies after the approval/background check process is completed.  
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Using – or even collecting - data in this manner, 
however, may violate the individual‘s right to privacy.  
While the pursuit and detection of terrorist activity has 
been identified as an important part of protecting citizens 
from calamity, a very fine balance between law enforcement 
activity and preservation of individual privacy presents 
itself as a primary goal of a democratic society.   
Given the need identified for terrorism detection, 
combined with the potential usefulness of data mining 
across a vast spectrum of available data, data mining may 
present a useful tool.  The use of data involving personal 
information of U.S. citizens however remains subject to the 
fine balance between the need for privacy and the desire 
for detection of malicious activity.  If it was possible to 
create a useful and realistic body of data representative 
of actual PII, it could be used to develop data mining 
programs without concern for violating privacy rights of 
individuals.    
B.   DATA CHARCTERISTICS    
To be valid for use in data mining program evaluation 
or research, synthetic data needs to be both realistic and 
useful.  A third category that is related to realism and 
usefulness is fidelity. 
1. Realism 
To be realistic, data needs to statistically mirror 
real population data.  For example, if considering a 
database containing airline passenger information, 
individuals on a flight manifest would ideally be broken 
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down proportionally into realistic percentages of country 
of origin and ethnicity based on real flight data.  Other 
attributes important to realism in this example might 
include age, gender, and final destination.  Flight 
manifests would need to mirror accurate numbers of 
passengers per real flight data.  To create such realistic 
data, extensive statistical data based on real data would 
need to be attained and/or calculated prior to creating the 
model used to synthesize the data. 
  An added complication is the interconnection between 
multiple data sets.  Effective data mining does not 
evaluate data in isolation.  In this example, most likely 
other data would be correlated against the flight data.  To 
be realistic, the flight data would need to be matched by 
other synthetic databases.  Such databases could include 
banking or immigration records, for example.  Secondary 
databases such as these would need to include some of the 
same synthetic individuals as the others that are present 
in the primary dataset.  And, as with flight manifests, any 
secondary datasets would need to have some metric to 
measure realism.   
Interestingly, any statistics based on real data could 
present similar problems with ―anonymization‖ as mentioned 
in previous chapters depending on the depth of the data.  
Herein lays a potential paradox: the more that synthetic 
data relies upon real statistics, the greater the chance 
that mirroring real data may leak information about the 
real datasets on which it is based.  At one extreme lies 
the potential of re-identification.  At a lower extreme, 
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other information could be leaked, such as the number of 
children in a condominium association, or the minimum and 
maximum income of a person living in an apartment building.  
Given the primary goal of creating synthetic data to 
prevent violations of privacy, any attempt to create such 
data would need to be cautious in this regard.    
2. Usefulness 
Realism alone is not sufficient.  Synthetic data for 
evaluation would need to be comprised of a statistically 
significant number of entries.  For example, a synthetic 
driver‘s license dataset containing 100 entries used to 
test a data mining program at the state population level 
would not be statistically significant.       
To be useful, data would also need to be presented in 
a certain form.  Perhaps to be realistic the data would be 
created in such a manner as not to be initially useful to 
the program, and require modification to faithfully 
represent reality.  In this case, research into the format 
of data output by actual systems intended to be used as 
input into the new program would need to be thoroughly 
understood and copied; or perhaps the data would need to be 
created in a manner consistent with the input format of the 
program.  Such decisions would be dependent on the goal of 
the data mining program under development. 
C.    DATA SYNTHESIS; APPROACHES TO MODELING 
 Creating fake data involves creating some model in 
which to simulate real data.  Models could take many  
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approaches and utilize various technologies.  Three 
possible approaches to modeling synthesized data are 
presented below. 
1.  Manual Creation 
In this approach, a human operator simply creates data 
in a ―brute-force‖ manner according to the requirements of 
the data mining program.  For example, the model might call 
for creation of a 30-year-old man who resides at some 
address.  The creator would simply manufacturer the record 
creatively.     
2.  Automated Direct Creation of Realistic Data 
The Automated Direct Creation of Realistic Data model 
is one in which the model outputs only the data that will 
be used in an arbitrary data mining research program.  In 
other words, the model does nothing more than synthesize 
and concatenate strings ideally representing some 
meaningful approximation of realistic data.   
For example, such a model drawing from some resource 
of meaningful names or rule-based algorithm might produce a 
record: 
<FName, LName, Street Address, City, State>  
for a non-real individual.  Such records would be generated 
by the model and represent its only output.  Every 
pertinent event to an individual data item history would be 
created explicitly.  As in the previous example, this model 
would also create some 30-year-old man, however some 
automation would be involved.  Rather than a human simply 
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inventing the person, the data forming the elements (e.g., 
name, address, etc.) could come from some other existing 
database(s), or be randomly generated within certain 
parameters.     
3. Generative Simulation 
In contrast to the previous models, the Generative 
Simulation model would need to apply a methodology taking 
into account the notional world in which the data ―resides‖ 
and a simulation of the passage of time.   
Utilizing the previous example, in the simulated 
―world‖ in which the data resides the fabricated individual 
is 30 years old.  But what happened to that individual 30 
years prior to the present?  With the manual model and 
Automated Direct Creation of Realistic Data model, a  
30-year-old individual would be created.  With the 
generative model, the individual might be born 30 years in 
the past to two simulated parents and allowed to ―grow‖ 
within the simulation.  The person would presumably have an 
address, school, and other environmental variables 
potentially affecting his/her attributes at age 30 after 30 
years of simulation.     
The generative model not only produces the desired 
datasets for input into the hypothetical data mining 
program, but also contains hidden variables and rules used 
in the conduct of the simulation and which are not reported 
in the outputs.  The simulation is based on some objective 
―ground truth‖ world model that produces the resultant  
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data.  These values could be used to validate the outputs 
of the data mining program, or to suggest new research 
directions. 
Urban Sim employs such a generative model.  Urban Sim 
allows city planners to take an existing city model, apply 
changes in the present (e.g., build a bridge), and simulate 
the impact the changes may have on the city in the future 
(Waddell, 2002).  Urban Sim is not a model conducive to 
synthesizing data for counterterrorism, since it does not 
generate data at the person level. 
4. Comparison of Approaches 
The models presented above are categories of models.  
They could be implemented in many different ways.  As broad 
categories however, the two represent a relatively complete 
grouping of models that could be used to synthesize data.  
This section further explores the models at this higher 
level of abstraction without discussing technical 
implementation details. 
In terms of realism, the merits these models are 
heavily dependent on the merits of the approach used in 
their development.  In other words, a good implementation 
of one would always be better than a bad implementation of 
the other.  In this way, the models have several 
similarities.  Each would be subject to the bias (or lack 
of bias) of the creator(s) and built-in rules of the 
simulation.  They would require careful attention and 
decision to types of names, gender, ethnicities and creeds 
produced in the output, depending on the goals of the 
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program.  The models would also require decision as to the 
sharing and protection of datasets based on the level of 
realism of the data.  Finally, both models would be 
required to produce data of sufficient depth and texture in 
order to be useful to a data mining program.    
An argument supporting the merits of the Generative 
Model comes from the field of Computer Graphics.  Creating 
simulations of moving clouds, humans, or other subjects 
encountered in reality, researchers found success in 
injecting underlying data variables also based on reality.  
For example, a simple simulation of a human walking may not 
initially look realistic to a real human observer.  After 
providing the simulated human with data representing bones 
and veins, however, the walking simulation gains an 
additional measure of realistic movement.  Albrecht, Haber, 
& Seidel (2003) provide an example of this type of 
simulation, modeling human hands using an underlying 
anatomical structure.  In order to realistically simulate 
hand movements, models are provided with realistic data 
simulating such variables as skin elasticity and muscle 
contraction. 
An argument against the use of the Generative Model is 
the difficulty in effecting its implementation.  If not 
properly executed, a generative model might produce 
unrealistic data over time (i.e., simulated time).  For 
example, a poorly implemented model might create an 
individual attending University for 20 years or who has 
multiple spouses.  The quality of the resulting output, 
used as input to a data mining program in development, 
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would be non-deterministic to a great extent.  Assuming a 
large volume of data was produced, evaluating the quality 
of the data would be difficult.  The actual evaluation of 
the quality of the data might not be undertaken until 
actually used as input to the data mining program.  If the 
data was faulty, instead of testing the abilities of the 
program under development, the program itself might apply 
or waste its resources simply on finding the errors 
resident in the test data set. 
D.   DATA SYNTHESIS; ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.  Creating Names 
Given the desired task of creating data mirroring PII 
in a realistic way, a primary data item would be names of 
people.  Depending on the methods used to synthesize names, 
the potential exists to create names that actually exist in 
reality.  If synthesized names match real people‘s names, 
it may present privacy concerns or create public relations 
problems for the sponsoring agency.  This may or may not be 
an issue depending on the aims of the research/program.   
  One method of creating names might be to create 
separate databases containing last names and first names.  
Sources for the databases could be realistic sources such 
as telephone directories or non-realistic sources, such as 
a baby name book sold to expectant Parents for first names 
and lists of common last names (e.g., data sources listing 
surnames by geographical area for genealogists).  The model 
would concatenate data items from each of the two databases 
to create simulated people having realistic names, first 
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and last.  In either case, it would be possible to create 
the name of a real person, though for sake of argument 
using a telephone directory would most likely have a 
greater probability of creating a match to an actual 
person.   
A second consideration is the characteristics of the 
names created.  To avoid matching genuine (i.e., real) 
names, a model might produce names comprised of gibberish.  
For example, the unlikely and ethnically ambiguous name 
―Wicoiu E. Gjdoi‖ could be generated and used.  A problem 
with this approach is that, to human analysts developing or 
testing a data mining program, such names contain no 
extrinsic information such as ethnicity, national origin, 
etc.  Such information might be relevant to a data mining 
application.  Without any historical or ethnic basis, all 
of the names created would generally be indistinguishable 
from each other.  Depending on the goals of the model, such 
an approach might not be helpful.   
To be realistic, a model might attempt to create names 
that mirror ethnic reality.  The model might have many 
ethnicities represented, with first and last names 
deliberately paired together.  For example, a realistic 
model might not produce the resultant name ―Seamus 
O‘Muhammed‖ but instead ―Seamus O‘Toole.‖  As previously 
mentioned, the more realistic the names become the greater 
the chance would be of mimicking real persons.  Using 
ethnicities also might create the impression of ethnic 
targeting/profiling, depending on the model.  
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2. Protecting Data 
Thus far, discussion of which organizations, agencies, 
or institutions might create synthetic data and for which 
purpose (research or operational use) for counterterrorism 
has not been explored.  However, it could be presumed that 
such a body of data would be created for the purposes of 
research.  Assuming a useful body of fabricated data was 
created, considerations might be needed to be taken in 
terms of protecting the data.   
Depending on the level of reality of the data (as per 
the previous two paragraphs), some overlapping of reality 
(such as real names of real people, or real social security 
numbers existing in the data) might occur.  In such a case, 
open release of such a body of data might not be 
appropriate.   
A second problem with releasing a body of data created 
for counterterrorism could lay in the nature and 
revelations of the data.  Depending on the model(s) used to 
generate the data, releasing the data could present several 
problems.  First, if the data was geared toward a certain 
data mining program, the details or mechanisms of the 
program itself might be revealed in the data.  Such 
revelations could compromise the investigative strategy 
behind the program.  Second, data that was infused with 
deliberate terrorist targets could be viewed by civil 
libertarians of indicating a political or racial bias 
(presumed or otherwise) of the program and/or its creators.  
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V.  DATA MODALITIES 
 The broad term data refers to numerous categories of 
information.  From distinct groups of binary digits to 
shades of black and white in a traditional photograph, or 
from noise energy to neuro-responses felt on the skin, the 
term data can mean many things.  In the lesser scope of 
computer science, counterintelligence, and data mining, the 
term still comprises a large range of varying types of 
information.  It is, therefore, useful to discuss the types 
of data that might be synthesized for data mining purposes.   
A.   TYPES OF DATA 
The following represent generally broad categories of 
data that are available or may be used for the purposes of 
counterterror.    
1.  Record-Based 
Record-based data  represents the traditional 
―database‖ collection of records increasingly used 
throughout the information world (Fayyad & Uthurusamy, 
2002).  Records include anything from names and addresses 
to amounts of money in an account, height and weight, or 
social security number.  Records are generally anything 
created at a point in time that, once recorded, remain 
useful as representative of fact.  For example, if an 
individual‘s social security number is established and 
recorded (as record), even if it is subsequently changed, 
the initial record remains a fact established.  The fact 
may or may not be useful.  Data representing records 
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generally take on an accepted form useful to the using 
entity (e.g., manually recorded by implement in established 
fields on a paper form, or ASCII (digital) representation 
readable by a human on an output media).   
Records are useful to data mining in several areas.  
First, when stored in digital media, records represent a 
simple way to effect the process of data mining based on 
the characteristics of record- based data.  That is, such 
data can be represented in very few characters (e.g., 
numbers and letters) which are generally packaged in 
distinct and identifiable patterns.  As such, algorithms 
can be created to manipulate these finite patterns in 
meaningful ways and in useable time.   
Record-based data represents perhaps the most 
accessible format for synthesis and for use in a data 
mining program.  It offers a typical genre of information 
used to define people, places and things, and is a mainstay 
of most databases having specific defined fields.  Given 
the predefined characteristics of record-based data, as 
well as its composition of a limited character set, record- 
based data provides a useful format for synthesis.  Names 
of people, places of residence or birth, or identifying 
numbers each represent finite items that can be mimicked.  
One aim of this thesis will be the exploration of the 
practicality of synthesizing record- based data.  A brief 
discussion and speculation of the feasibility of 
synthesizing other types of data is included in the 
following sections. 
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2.  Photographic Data 
Photographs, whether from traditional technology using 
photographic paper or modern digital technology, can be 
categorized as data able to be interpreted by the unaided 
human eye.  That is, photographic data (when properly 
displayed) mimics data the human eye views in nature and is 
thus meaningful to the human brain.  Digital photographic 
data has the added characteristic of its being represented 
(by definition) in binary (or other) form.  
Photographic data is useful in counterintelligence as 
a record of something that occurred or a representation at 
a specific point in time of the state of what was recorded 
in the photograph.  Such benefits may include geo-location, 
temporal location, or the intrinsic value of the 
photographed object itself.  It may identify an individual 
of interest from among a larger body of data.  As such, it 
is useful to data mining technology for counterterrorism.  
Using facial recognition features, researchers have 
demonstrated the ability to match the identities of 
individuals from photographic data (Zhao, Chellappa, 
Phillips, & Rosenfeld, 2003).   
Synthesis of photographs may present an effort without 
reward.  While possible to the extent that utilizing 
computer generated graphics technology may generate 
illustrations mimicking photographs, the time and creative 
energy involved, coupled with the limited output, may not 
prove valuable to a data mining approach.   
An alternative to generating synthetic photographic 
data lays in the potential use of actual photographs.  For 
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instance, photographs of real, deceased people, such as are 
available in Civil War photos, could be scanned and 
digitized to provide a useful body of data for a program.  
Depending on the requirements of the research, 
representations of such persons could be inserted into 
other photographs or backgrounds having certain locations, 
people or things.   
3.  Biometric Data 
Biometric data represents the unique features of an 
individual -- a living entity.  It relies upon modern 
technology (e.g., retinal scanners, fingerprint ink, etc.) 
to record these characteristics unique to the individual.  
Data, such as individual DNA or dental records, may be used 
to distinguish one individual from another.    
Similar to photographic data, biometric data is useful 
to data mining insofar as a person of interest may be 
located or identified from within a larger collection of 
data.  Like photographs, biometric data may be represented 
in digital form.  As such, data mining technology may be 
applied to the data.    
Biometric data could take on various forms.  While a 
fingerprint or retina could be viewed as an image, for 
coherence in a data mining program, each unique image could 
be represented as some sequence of numbers.  As such, a 
collection of unique numbers could be generated.  Whether 
or not they would be useful is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
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4.  Narrative Data    
Narrative data is prose recording events or stories 
known to a person (whether fact or fabricated).  Narrative 
data might be written or recorded on some voice recording 
media.  The data may contain useful information regarding 
events or individuals.  Examples include police reports and 
eyewitness accounts of events.  Narrative data is typically 
not created by the would-be subject of a data mining 
exercise. 
Narrative data is useful to data mining for 
counterterrorism.  Whether contained in voice recorded 
media or written (and transcribed to digital media) the 
data can be searched for items of interest such as names, 
person descriptions, vehicle descriptions, modus operandi, 
and so on.  The University of Arizona COPLINK project 
demonstrated some success using a neural network–based 
entity extractor for data items (such as narcotic or 
criminal names) from police narrative reports (Chen, et 
al., 2003).    
Narrative data could be created primarily using a 
creative approach.  Like an author writing fiction, a human 
creator of narrative data would manufacture the 
information.  This approach would be inefficient and 
perhaps not useful to a data mining program, unless a small 
amount of data were required.  Any other machine-based 
methodology would either require a model that could 
approach the capabilities of a human or deliberately embed 
information in existing writings, such as novels or 
articles.  Existing narratives could be repurposed and/or 
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anonymized.  Whether the latter would be useful or mirror 
genuine narratives would require further research.  The 
original ELIZA project and subsequent work remains an 
example of the difficulty of machines in mimicking humans 
(Weizenbaum, 1983).  Further, ―chatterbots‖ such as ELIZA 
also rely on input from a human user in order to maintain 
some amount of realism.  
5.  Free Format Data    
Free format data is not limited by fields or format 
rules.  Examples include emails, Web pages and voice 
recordings.  While similar to narrative data, it is 
distinguished here as a separate category in terms of its 
characteristics.  While narrative data generally tells a 
story, having a subject and timeline of events, free format 
data can include any non-formatted or fielded character.   
Free format data could prove very useful to the task 
of data mining for counterterrorism.  Assuming a useful 
body of synthesized e-mails could be produced, the data 
simulating communications within a malicious social network 
could be used as input to a program.  But like photographs, 
the effort to create free format data might not yield 
sufficient reward.  Genuine free format data could be used 
that does not contain PII or is not governed by privacy 
laws.  Additionally, some amount of data already exists for 
use in research, such as the ENRON emails.  Such existing 
data might be useful itself, or could be modified for use 
in a specific program. 
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Like narrative data, generating free format data would 
require some creative approach, presumably by a human, 
unless some body of data containing non-meaningful 
information was desired.    
B.   SIMPLIFIED TEST DATA 
A miscellaneous category of data is data specifically 
created for model testing purposes.  It can be 
differentiated from other synthetic data based on scale and 
complexity.   
Simplified test data might be required to test certain 
functional areas of a data mining program in development.  
For example, if testing the ability of a program to read 
names from a file and redirect them to a database in usable 
form, the test data might contain certain characters more 
likely to create errors in the program code, such as an 
underscore or percent character, accented characters, and 
so forth.  Otherwise, the data might not have or need any 
realism in terms of fidelity to actual names of persons.   
Test data might also be synthesized for more complex 
scenarios.  Data may be required to test a program‘s 
ability to extract or identify specific elements.  For 
example, datasets created with known targets hidden in the 
data could test the efficacy of the program, to perform 
phonetic name matches, to handle typos, and to winnow out 
deliberate near-matches that might produce false positives 
that may also be deliberately embedded in the data.   
Test data might also be used to test the ability of a 
program to detect anomalies in data.  For example, a data 
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mining program might seek to detect variations in names.  A 
targeted data item such as the last name ―Jones‖ might be 
resident in data as ―janes‖ or ―jonas.‖  Test data could be 
created to mimic such errors that might be encountered in 
reality. 
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VI. A DATA SYNTHESIS EXERCISE 
A.   REPRODUCING THE DATA 
The descriptions provided in Chapter III regarding the 
Automated Tracking System (ATS) represent a limited but 
illustrative view of the extensive scope of some federal 
data mining Programs.  As with the ATS, a new data mining 
computer program would feasibly source information from 
numerous databases.  These databases are in practice often 
updated in real time.  As with the ATS, which sources PNR 
from flight data, it can be presumed that such updates 
occur constantly and daily.  The source data would most 
likely contain numerous fields and a vast number of 
populated entries.  Moreover, such a program might contain 
several technologies performing across several commodity 
areas, as with the ATS.   
Synthesizing data to test a new system such as the ATS 
would require an incredible effort of research and 
production.  In addition to populating data consisting of 
fabricated PII across the numerous databases used by the 
program, the data itself would need to meet certain 
requirements; specifically, the data would need to be 
created in such a way that it was realistic and useful. 
1.  Deconstructing the ATS 
In order to further explore the possibility of 
creating synthetic data for counterterrorism data mining 
Programs, an exercise based on the entire ATS would be 
prohibitive.  Using the ATS as a genuine example of federal 
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data mining programs does offer a basis for an exercise on 
a smaller scale however.  Deconstructing the ATS offers 
some insight into its subcomponents, although available 
information is limited.  Taken together, the DHS Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) report ―Review of the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement‘s Compliance and 
Enforcement Unit‖ (2005) and excerpts from the Federal 
Register (2006)4 provide some information on the extent of 
the ATS and related systems.   
The Federal Register provides information on the ATS, 
while the DHS report provides information on three programs 
specifically related to border protection, including the 
National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 
the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 
(SEVIS), the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), and a fourth ―environment‖ 
termed the Treasury Enforcement Communication System 
(TECS).  
Interestingly, the Federal Register (reporting solely 
on ATS) does not mention any of the three border protection 
systems, and the DHS OIG report does not mention the ATS.  
Yet both mention the TECS, which appears to be a 
predecessor to the ATS, though ATS has not replaced TECS.  
Presumably, some migration of terms and systems may be in 
evidence here related to the creation of the DHS and 
resulting agency consolidations.  Regardless, it is 
realistic that the three border protection programs are 
                     
4 Federal Register: November 2, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 212). 
 57 
related to, if not a part of, the ATS.  The Federal 
Register states: 
ATS involves the collection and creation of 
information that is maintained in a system of 
records.  Previously, this information was 
covered by the…(TECS) system of records notice, 
as ATS is a functional module associated with the 
environment of TECS.  ATS is employed as an 
analytical tool to enhance CBP screening and 
targeting capabilities by permitting query-based 
comparisons of different data modules associated 
with the TECS system, as well as comparisons with 
data sets from sources outside of TECS. 
Further, Appendix (A) of the DHS OIG report (2005) offers 
some illustration of these systems and their relation to 
investigatory workflow.  
2.  A Realistic Data Group to Populate 
―Drilling Down‖ further on one of the three border 
protection programs, the SEVIS program provides yet a 
narrower example on which to focus this study.  SEVIS 
represents the ―technical part‖ of the Student Exchange 
Visitor Program (SEVP).  SEVP provides data on foreign 
students obtaining non-immigrant visas in order to study in 
the United States.  Through SEVIS, it further allows the 
government to track authorized dates (and deadlines) of the 
foreign student ―stays‖ within the U.S.  On a broader 
scale, SEVP includes partnering Universities, which carry 
some responsibility to administer SEVIS and must provide 
trained individuals to implement the program.  No foreign 
student may study in the U.S., except under SEVP and such 
partner universities. 
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A main input to SEVIS is a form potential students 
must complete prior to their entry into the U.S. in order 
to pay an applicable SEVIS fee.  The DHS I-901 ―Fee 
Remittance for Certain F, J, and M Nonimmigrants‖ form 
collects several items of PII from the individual (see 
Appendix A).  The data on this form presents a realistic 
(actual) group of data fields useful to a data synthesis 
exercise; it represents a known input to possible federal 
data mining programs.     
3.  Available Statistics to Support Realism  
In order to attempt to mirror realism in the chosen 
body of data, real statistics governing student populations 
are helpful.  Presumably, gathering actual statistics 
regarding the entire foreign student population in the 
United States is not possible (except from the SEVIS 
databases themselves).  Continuing to narrow the focus of 
this study in the interest of practicality, the student 
population statistics of one university would be 
instructive.  The California State University, Long Beach 
(CSULB) provides statistics on foreign students.  Appendix 
(B) provides a sample of the statistics available; other 
statistics including gender, ethnicity by degree level, 
citizenship status, and other such tables are also 
provided. 
4.  Secondary Database  
To mimic a real data mining program, some secondary 
database is required to accompany the student database for 
input to the program.  Candidates could include flight 
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manifests, local phone books (with addresses) or campus 
directories, or driver‘s license information, among others.  
Given the likeliness of a foreign student desiring to 
operate a motor vehicle while residing in the United 
States, the California Driver‘s License form was chosen as 
a secondary information source.  Appendix C contains a 
sample application form.   
This exercise has attempted to achieve some degree of 
realism by utilizing details of a known data mining 
program, namely the ATS.  No available public information 
has been found that indicates whether or not ATS has access 
to (or uses) driver‘s license data as one of its input 
databases.  For the purposes of this exercise, however, it 
is reasonable to expect that data such as that included in 
a driver‘s license record, if not actually used in a 
program, is closely related to genuine inputs.  Moreover, 
one of the primary aims of the exercise is to ascertain if 
synthesizing data is possible and useful.  Using driver‘s 
license information as a secondary data source for the ATS 
provides an avenue to achieve this aim. 
B.   MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The following model represents one possible and 
simplified approach to synthesizing data.  The model 
attempts to capture a small portion of the ATS as outlined 
in previous sections; it does not attempt to synthesize 
input data for the entire program.  Lastly, it is not 
presented as a usable data generator (of which many already 
 60 
exist)5 but as an opportunity to explore methods of data 
generation for comparison and illustration for the purposes 
of this thesis. 
 As mentioned previously, many details of the ATS 
program are unavailable.  Additionally, using two simple 
record-based data sources offers a realistic starting point 
to assess feasibility of data synthesis.  The chosen data 
sources are the SEVIS fee form for foreign students 
(Appendix A) and the California driver‘s license 
application (Appendix C).  For purposes of brevity and 
practicality, not all fields of the chosen data sources 
will be applied.  A diagram of the model is seen in FIGURE 
(2).  The central focus of the model is the abstract data 
item representing an individual person. 
For purposes of brevity and practicality, not all 
fields of the chosen data sources will be applied.  A 
diagram of the model is seen in FIGURE (2).  The central 
focus of the model is the abstract data item representing 
an individual person. 
1. Inputs 
The foundation of the model is based upon ―seed‖ 
records.  The seed records are the most raw input of the 
model (i.e., the ―building blocks‖ for generating more 
comprehensive data) used to generate full records 
representing individual persons.  Seed records are 
characterized by having a minimum number of characters to 
represent one full field item and other associated values.   
                     




























Figure (1) Model Overview, Automated Direct Creation. 
 
For example, an individual field in a seed record 
would be one last name.  Associated values would include 
items such as nationality and country of origin.  The 
purpose of the seed records is to provide the model with 
base data from which to generate full data representing 
persons.   Seed records are contained in files grouped by 
category such as ―last names.‖  A surname seed file (.csv) 
might look like that contained in FIGURE (3), where names 
are assigned unique identifiers for ethnicity, such as ‗E‘ 






LName, Ethnicity, CountryOfOrigin 
Jones, English, US 
O‘Connor, Irish, UK 
Deutsch, German, DE 
Nowak, Polish, US 
… 
Figure (2) Sample ―seed‖ surname file.csv 
 
A similar seed file for first names would provide the input 
from which to match with surnames.   
The sources of the seed record files vary.  In order 
to minimize creation of genuine items of PII, files are 
either manually generated or sourced from on-line records 
(such as available lists of baby names for expectant 
parents).  Further, no seed records are sourced from data 
containing more than one seed item.  That is, first names 
attributable to last names, or vice versa, from any source 
are not used in order to avoid reproduction (or even the 
perceived reproduction) of a real person from a valid data 
source.  For example, a record containing the string ―Jim 
Strom‖ is not used.  The source of the record could 
ultimately hail from some genuine data source traceable to 
a real person.  Only records containing first names or last 
names are used.     
Numbers, including identification numbers, street 
numbers, ages, etc., are generated pseudo-randomly where 
appropriate, and within parameters based on applicable 
rules.  For example, the age of an individual attending a 
university would be generated based on student population 
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statistics (Appendix B) and fall within rules, such as the 
age not falling below 17.  Otherwise, the program would 
assign peoples‘ ages within these parameters. 
2.  Outputs   
The output of the model includes three main groups of 
synthesized data records presented in long form and 
collected in three files.  The first group represents the 
―ground truth‖ data.  This data provides what is true and 
accurate with regards to the data in the simulated world.  
It provides a starting point to generate the two other 
files and introduce error.  The below illustrates the 
format of the three groups: 
(1) <LName, FName, MI, DOB, Nationality>    
(2) <LName, FName, MI, Nationality, DOB, SEVIS_ID#> 
(3) <LName, FName, MI, Street#, StreetName, ZipCode, 
DOB> 
The output files demonstrate realism based on a mix of 
ethnic names matching statistics as provided in Appendix 
(B).  The length of each output file is dependent on the 
length/depth of the inputs.   
3.  Treatment of Inputs/Record Creation 
Name (first and last) seed files, delineated by 
ethnicity, are concatenated randomly to create full names 
using the Person Class defined in FIGURE (4).  Middle 
initials are assigned randomly, to include some records 
having no middle initial.  Names are created within rules 
governing ethnicity.  For example, seed files containing 
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Polish surnames would be concatenated only with Polish 









Figure (3) Class:person 
 
Using the person class, a file of persons is generated from 
the seed files.  For instance, 
 
Create_a_person(nationality, age) 
 set first name from names table with nationality 
 set last name from names table with nationality 
 generate middle or no initial 
 set DOB = year of simulation - age  
set country of origin 
 
 The nationality variable allows the simulation to 
reflect the weights of nationalities in a group of people 
via a configuration file in order to mirror statistics 
representing reality.  For example, using Appendix (B) as 
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input, weights (from 2009) would list 2.5% Australian, .4% 
Brazilian, and so forth.  A list is created mirroring the 
percentages.  For example, 
 
List of nationalities = [] 
     For each nationality in configuration file: 
  Add nationality to list 100*(%) times 
 
Given a list populated with accurate percentages of 
nationalities, output files are generated reflecting the 




 N = Random draw of nationality from list 
Weighted last_name(N): 
 Random draw of last name for nationality = N 
 
Across a statistically significant number of persons, the 
weights of nationalities reflected in the output file would 
more closely resemble the statistical base. 
 The age variable is similarly passed through the 
create_a_person method.  Given preset parameters such as, 
 
Student_min_age = 18 
Student_max_age = 30 
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 Month = random month 
 Day = random day 
 Year = current year –  
(random[student_min_age:student_max_age]) 
 DOB = Month + Day + Year 
Or instead of choosing a random year for the age, 
statistics could be applied based on real data. 
4.  Deliberate Introduction of Error 
Some level of error within data records is desirable.  
As per reality, error in data might be introduced at the 
point of administrative data entry or by intentional action 
of an individual.  Data mining programs must negotiate 
errors and variations in data. 
The amount of error introduced in data synthesis is 
controlled by an adjustable ―error‖ parameter based upon 
the needs of the program.  For example, a selection of 
[.05] would present a 5% error rate within selected fields 
of data.  The error is introduced to the data file in the 
creation of a number of persons.  For instance: 
 
Error rate = .05 
Make 1000 people: 
 P <- create a person(weighted nationality, age) 
 If random < Error rate, make_error(P) 
 Append P to output file 
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To maintain record of the fact that an error is an error 
amongst a large body of otherwise created data, the correct 
version of the data upon which the error is based must be 
extant and recallable.  The use of the ground truth file 
(see FIGURE 2) allows for the maintenance of correct data.  
Errors may be introduced in either or both files from the 
ground truth file.  Once full name records are generated, a 
modification may be applied to a field in the record and 
passed to the resulting data files with error.   
5.  Control of Duplication 
Some duplication of data within synthesized records is 
desirable.  For example, two students might have the same 
address, given that they share a residence.  Deliberate 
duplication in such cases is included in the model in a 
controlled manner. Duplication may be inherent depending on 
the technique used for creating names.  Some duplication of 
last names is also desirable, as seen in reality.   
A design choice is whether duplication is randomly 
generated or targeted.  Targeted duplication is focused on 
various data groups (e.g., certain last name ethnic 
groups), where certain last names are deliberately copied 
to create a new individual.  Random duplication is simply 
based on a percentage variable applied across all data.  
For example, a choice of (.02) would choose 2% of names and 




Duplication rate = .02 
Make 1000 persons 
 P <- create_a_person(weighted nationality, age) 
 If random < Duplication rate make_dupe(P) 
 Append P to output file 
 
Undesirable duplication includes ID numbers, which 
must be unique.  Simple incrementing of ID number creation 
parameters within the model ensure unique data per 
individual.   
If real data is available, error rates matching that 
seen in real systems could be used to generate the model.  
For testing purposes, error rates could be deliberately 
elevated in order to test the ―coping‖ mechanisms of the 
program under development.   
6.  Limitations of This Model 
This model presents perhaps the most simplistic 
approach to synthesizing data within the framework of data 
mining for counterterrorism.  As such, it is useful as a 
baseline model.   
The model is limited in several areas.  The model only 
contains data from two original sources.  Further, the data 
from the two sources is limited in terms of number of 
fields presented (whereas the original source documents 
have more fields available).  The outputs are also limited 
based on quantity and quality.  The quantity is limited by 
the number of seed files which must be manually created.  
The quality is limited to the creativity and completeness 
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of the input seed data.  For example, the statistics 
presented in Appendix B demonstrate many different 
nationalities.  Whether or not all of these nationalities 
are recreated in the model and assigned realistic ethnic 
names (requiring further research) affects the quality of 
the outputs. 
Street names and numbers are overly simplified.  
Following the approach of the Urban Sim model, a genuine 
city grid could be used to represent actual streets and 
numbers.  The quality of the data would depend on the level 
of detail of the model.  For example, is it important if a 
certain ―target‖ student lives at an address next to, or 
within sight of, another student?  Is it important to the 
program whether or not a student lives within walking 
distance of the University or some social gathering site? 
If desirable, actual data could be taken from a 
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VII. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A.   CHALLENGES TO CREATING SYNTHETIC DATA 
 Previous chapters have outlined many of the challenges 
and issues inherent in creating synthetic data for use in 
data mining.  A concerted effort undertaken to create a 
useful and realistic body of data involving PII may 
encounter other difficulties or potential barriers.    
1.  Effort of Human Designer 
Developing a model to explore possible methods of data 
creation (such as that presented in Chapter VI) offers some 
insight into the difficulties of creating synthetic data.  
One major difficulty may arise based on the scale of the 
data required to test a major data mining program under 
development.  
The approach outlined in Chapter VI requires 
considerable effort upfront (i.e., prior to automation) on 
the part of a human actor/designer to create (or source) 
the input files.  The input files must contain a number of 
first and last names of a quantity directly related to the 
number of full names desired in the output.  Moreover, they 
must be correlated by ethnicity.  The human designer is 
required to understand which names correlate with which 
ethnicity.  Assuming the designer has automated a process 
to input presorted files of ethic names by group into the 
model, these files still must be located (if available from 
a third party/source), classified, and possibly manipulated 
to make usable.    
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Assuming that a realistic and useful body of synthetic 
data would be very large, mirroring to some degree the 
number of records available to a data mining program in 
reality, the amount of effort required by the designer 
could be prohibitive.  At some level, the human effort 
required to create a large number of names might negate the 
usefulness of this approach (automated direct creation), 
making it similar to the manual method in terms of time and 
effort.   
2.  Perceived Privacy of Data 
Another possible issue resulting from the vastness of 
scale arises with regard to perceived privacy.  The greater 
the amount of ―fake‖ people created, the greater the chance 
of creating individuals who mirror actual people, to 
include full names, dates of birth, etc.  To illustrate, 
assume a body of data is created to meet requirements of 
some program for output of one million names/records.  If, 
for example, 2% or 20,000 records are created that exactly 
match the PII of real people, has the benefit of creating 
fake data to avoid privacy issues been negated?  If so, 
what level of ―real person data matches‖ would be 
acceptable, and who would decide it?   
Assuming a synthesized body of data contained the PII 
of ―fake‖ people, and some amount of the records 
coincidentally matched that of real people, the 
philosophical question arises as to whether or not the data 
is really ―fake.‖  The question might be best answered (or 
determined) by the perception of those individuals whose 
PII coincidentally appeared in the data.  If a woman named 
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Jane A. Thomas born on August 3, 1965 found this data 
exactly matching her PII in a data base used for data 
mining for terrorism, would she object to its existence 
even if told it was completely manufactured by chance?    
As mentioned in prior chapters, an alternative to this 
approach would be to use names that generally do not occur 
in reality.  The abstract range of this data could include 
semi-realistic names such as ―TJamesTTTT Smith‖ to names 
comprised of complete gibberish.  A problem with this 
approach, however, is that the greater the extent to which 
it is desirable that created names do not mirror genuine 
names/persons, the less a program can rely on existing-name 
databases for input.  Alternatively, at the ―gibberish end‖ 
of the range of created names, assuming a completely 
computer-generated process is used to create random strings 
representing names, the possibility still exists to create 
names matching those of real persons.  Ultimately, any 
data-synthesis model will most likely include 
facets/approaches that do not completely mitigate privacy 
concerns, however minimal. 
3.  Human/Designer Bias 
It is likely that some amount of human bias (or 
ignorance) will manifest in the system.  Humans are always 
involved in such a process, as a human designed/wrote the 
program.  Again, using the model from Chapter VI, groups of 
names by ethnicity must be identified and grouped for 
input.  The designer must make some decisions regarding 
these names. 
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One example involves nationality versus ethnicity.  A 
surname common in a given geographic area might be labeled 
by the nationality coinciding with the geographic area, but 
in fact, the name is considered (by those who possess it) 
to be belonging to another origin.  It is also realistic to 
assume the designer is not an expert in such matters.   
Such errors in explicit or implicit meta-data of the 
created names (i.e., the manner in which they are treated 
in the system based on decisions of ethnicity as pointed to 
by meta-data) could decrease the effectiveness of the data 
in testing mining programs.  For example, the prerequisites 
of a synthetic body of data might include names/ethnicities 
to be used as ―target names‖ by the data mining program 
being tested.  The data mining program might also be 
affected by its own degree of designer bias.  In general, a 
program‘s ability to function correctly with synthetic data 
may indicate that the program works, or it may simply 
indicate an error in the way that the synthetic data was 
created.  A problem may arise if the bias evident in the 
data/system(s) does not match reality or that of the other. 
B.   FUTURE WORK 
The automated direct-creation model presented in 
Chapter VI is very basic.  This model could be expanded to 
include more fields representing genuine data bases used in 
federal data mining programs.  Additionally, it is also 
based on the notion of ―seed‖ records.  Automation of data 
synthesis for full records can only begin once the input 
records are identified/created, presumably through a mostly 
manual and time consuming approach.  Work to automate the 
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creation of the seed files would streamline the approach, 
although it might also offer additional challenges in the 
areas of meeting goals of data realism. 
The automated direct-creation approach was compared 
with the generative approach in Chapter IV.  Of these two 
non-manual methods, the automated direct-creation is the 
more simple and easier to implement in terms of design and 
methodology.  The creation of a generative model would be a 
logical next-step to this area of research, perhaps 
providing additional insights into the challenges 
associated with synthetic data.  It also offers the 
potential for more realistic data that better takes into 
account time as a notion of reality. 
A third area of additional research involves the 
broadening of the understanding of federal data mining 
programs.  This thesis segregated one distinct program 
based on availability of information and focused on a 
fraction of its potential data sources.  Research providing 
a more complete framework of existing data mining program 
architecture, structure, inputs, and methodology would help 
to illustrate real and additional requirements of useful 
synthetic data.  Once a complete and thorough understanding 
of a program (or programs) was gained, an attempt to create 
usable data for testing a specific program could be 
undertaken.   
A fourth area exists in terms of the type(s) of data 
being synthesized.  This thesis focused solely on record-
based data.  Other interesting data that might be useful to 
a data mining program could include cell phone tower 
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records, voice data, or photographs.  The input to various 
data mining programs may consist of other types of data, 
such as those outlined in Chapter V.   
Lastly, extensive knowledge of several real data 
mining programs could provide a deeper understanding of 
data used in such programs, to include an analysis of 
similarities and differences in data.  This level of 
understanding might provide details and characteristics 
leading to the creation of a more universal body of 
synthetic data.     
C.   dONCLUSIONS 
This thesis sought to explore and analyze the problem 
of creating synthetic data for use in data mining for 
counterterrorism, and to attempt to understand the 
feasibility of creating a useful body of such data. 
One barrier to understanding the extent of this issue 
remains in the lack of data regarding federal data mining 
programs.  Greater understanding of existing programs would 
be necessary to better assess the feasibility of creating a 
useful body of synthetic data.     
Using a small sample of records as likely input to 
federal programs, a simple model to create synthetic 
records of a small population of persons was created.  
Creating synthetic data on a vast scale, and which provides 
both realism and utility, however, would offer a 
significantly greater challenge, the feasibility of which 
remains questionable.       
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APPENDIX A:  DHS I-901 FORM 
The Department of Homeland Security I-901 (see next 
page) Form provides a vehicle for would-be non-immigrant 
students to pay the fee associated with the Student 
Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP).  The form provides ICE 
with detailed personal information regarding foreign 
students.  This information is a key part in the 
government‘s ability to track aliens within the United 
States, as is included here as an example of source data 





APPENDIX B:  SAMPLE STUDENT STATISTICS (CSU LONG 
BEACH) 
The following list (available at California State 
University web services) is provided as an example of 
statistics available for which to provide realism in 
generating synthetic data.  This type of statistics provide  
a guide for developing non-random parameters within a data 
generating model, the output of which would ideally mirror 
reality.  The specific data represented here is included as 
part of the data synthesis exercise involving foreign 




APPENDIX C:  SAMPLE CALIFORNIA DRIVER’S LICENSE 
APPLICATION (FORM DL44)  
The California driver‘s license application form is 
included as a secondary data source for use in the data 
synthesis exercise.  It represents likely data that might 
be one part of a greater group of data used in a typical 
data mining program.  As part of the data synthesis 
exercise involving foreign students, it is included as a 
data source given students‘ likely desire to operate 
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